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Now My Son, You Are a Man: The
Judicial Response to Uncounseled
Waivers of Miranda Rights by Juveniles
in Pennsylvania
That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens . . . . [W]e can-
not believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police
. . . He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the
victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to
lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it,
crush him.'
I. Introduction
Perhaps the most perplexing problem that confronts the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in the post-Miranda,2 post-Gault era is
that of waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles. The controversy cen-
ters upon the competency of a juvenile4 to make an intelligent, un-
derstanding, voluntary waiver of his or her constitutional rights with-
out the guidance of a parent, attorney, or other friendly adult.
In the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,5 the United
States Supreme Court held that when a person is taken into police
custody, or has been deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way, he must be advised of his constitutional rights.' The Court
realized that in custodial interrogations the "potentiality for compul-
sion is forcefully apparent."7 Without proper safeguards, the process
of in-custodial interrogation would compel an individual "to speak
I. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (Justice Douglas depicting the plight of a
juvenile suspect).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying
text.
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
4. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act defines "juvenile" as a person who has not
attained his eighteenth birthday. 18 U.S.C.A. § 5031 (West 1985). Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court Law uses the term "delinquent child" to describe a minor under the age of eighteen
years. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301 (1982).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him. Id. at 478-79.
7. Id. at 457.
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where he would otherwise not do so freely." 8 The Miranda decision
established a per se rule that unless there is a valid waiver of the
Miranda safeguards, any incriminating statements made by suspects
to the police will automatically be excluded from use at trial.9
In In re Gault,'0 the Supreme Court extended to juveniles in
delinquency proceedings the same right to legal counsel and right
against self-incrimination accorded adults in Miranda." While the
Miranda requirements established the minimum standards of protec-
tion for adults, Justice Fortas' majority opinion in Gault recognized
that even greater protection might be required when juveniles were
involved, since their immaturity and greater vulnerability placed
them at a greater disadvantage in their dealings with the police."2
Although the Court admitted that a juvenile could waive his rights,
the Court added that careful scrutiny was required to ensure that a
purported waiver by a juvenile was truly voluntary."3 Relevant fac-
tors for consideration include the age of the child, presence and com-
petence of parents, and the participation of an attorney.'
4
The Court cautioned that the holdings of Gault were limited
solely to the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceedings, and
explicitly left unanswered the question of what standard should be
applied to the pre-adjudicatory stages of the juvenile process. 15 Nev-
8. Id. at 467.
9. Id. at 479.
10. 387 U.S. I (1967).
II. Id. at 55.
12. The Court urged: "[T]he greatest care must be taken to assure that [a minor's]
admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also
that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."
Id. at 55. Prior to Gault, courts operated under the theory of parens patriae. Under this the-
ory, the state assumed the parents' role in taking custody of the juvenile, concerning itself with
the child's rehabilitation rather than his guilt. In exchange for this benevolent treatment the
juvenile gave up many constitutional protections accorded adults. See generally id. at 14-18.
13. Id. at 55. This comports with the earlier recognition by the Court in Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948), and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962), that in
assessing the voluntariness of a waiver by a juvenile, special consideration must be given to the
child's legal and psychological capacities.
14. 387 U.S. I, 55 (1967).
15.
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provi-
sions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do
not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For exam-
ple, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights appli-
cable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our at-
tention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process ...We consider only
the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the proceedings by
which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a
result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be
committed to a state institution.
Id. at 13.
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ertheless, state legislatures and state courts have utilized the spirit of
Gault to extend the rights enumerated therein to pre-adjudicatory
stages, specifically to custodial interrogation.' 6
According juveniles Miranda rights prior to interrogation did
not, however, resolve the legality and admissibility of juvenile confes-
sions at trial. Special problems and considerations surround the
waiver of Miranda safeguards by juveniles, including the decision to
talk to the police without an interested adult or counsel present. In-
deed, such difficulties were anticipated by the Court in a classic un-
derstatement in Gault, when it noted that "special problems may
arise with respect to waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination
by or on behalf of children."'1
7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has engaged in a particularly
The Court repeated this limitation in a footnote:
The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of juveniles, and of post-adjudi-
cation disposition, are unique to the juvenile process; hence what we hold in this
opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has
no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process.
Id. at 31, n.48.
At least one state court has interpreted the "no necessary applicability" phrase in the
Gault footnote as a statement by the Supreme Court implying that the Gault requirements
should apply "to other steps of the juvenile process unless they are otherwise obviated by the
nature and result of any such other steps." Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 328, 167
S.E.2d 163, 166 (1969). This interpretation was employed to justify the adoption of a per se
exclusionary rule relating to juvenile confessions in the Georgia juvenile court system.
16. Many commentators infer that Gault did establish Miranda rights for juveniles by
necessary implication and by virtue of the Court's observation, elsewhere in the opinion, that
"[Ilt would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to
hardened criminals but not to children." 387 U.S. at 47. According to this interpretation, it
makes no sense to accord juveniles Miranda rights at the adjudicatory stage if the outcome of
the hearing were made a foregone conclusion by depriving juveniles of the same rights at the
police interrogation stage. In response to the spirit and logic of Gault, therefore, virtually all
courts considering the matter have ruled that juveniles subjected to police interrogation must
be given the Miranda warnings. M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCE-
DURE 92 (1974); Schultz and Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, in PURSU-
ING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 26 (M. ROSENHEIM ed. 1976).
Many states have recognized this right by statute. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§
625, 627.5 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(1) (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-137(a) (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-595 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1109(a) (West Supp. 1987).
Other approaches, while not so direct, are intended to implement the same safeguards.
For example, the Uniform Juvenile Court Act provides:
A child charged with a delinquent act need not be a witness against or
otherwise incriminate himself. An extra-judicial statement, if obtained in the
course of violation of this Act or which would be constitutionally inadmissible in
a criminal proceeding, shall not be used against him ....
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 27(b) (1968). Pennsylvania is among the jurisdictions that
have adopted the Uniform Juvenile Court Act in whole or in part. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
6338(b) (Purdon 1982). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-31(b) (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-303 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(c) (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
27(2) (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-127(b)-(c) (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 652
(1981).
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 55 (1967).
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interesting struggle with the problem of uncounseled waivers of Mi-
randa rights by juveniles. This struggle has prompted a full-circle
evolution in the test that the court currently applies. In the most
recent development,1 8 the court discarded a newly created rebuttable
presumption that a juvenile is incompetent to waive his Miranda
rights without an opportunity to consult with an informed and inter-
ested adult. The court has now adopted a pure totality of the circum-
stances test. Thus, the court has returned to the analysis it employed
fourteen years ago.
This Comment traces the evolution of Pennsylvania case law
pertaining to the waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles. Special at-
tention is given to the development and underlying rationales of the
various approaches adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for
assessing the validity of a juvenile's waiver of constitutional rights.
The current state of the law and practice regarding waiver of Mi-
randa rights by juveniles in Pennsylvania is critically analyzed. The
special needs of the juvenile are noted and alternative approaches to
the vague commands of the Gault decision are suggested. The focus
at all times is upon establishing what constitutes the minimum pro-
tection necessary to assure the meaningful exercise of fifth and sixth
amendment rights by Pennsylvania's youth.
II. Development of Pennsylvania Case Law
A. The "Totality of the Circumstances" Test: The Traditional
Approach
Pennsylvania's courts apply a totality of the circumstances test
to determine whether an adult defendant has voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights. For example, in
Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 9 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court stated that in determining whether a defendant's con-
fession was voluntary the court should consider factors including the
duration and conditions of detention, the manifest attitude of the po-
lice toward the defendant, the defendant's physical and mental state,
and the presence of any coercive elements.2 In addition, the court
18. For a discussion of Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984),
see infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
19. 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968).
20. Id. at 149, 239 A.2d at 430. For more recent Pennsylvania cases following the Run-
die holding that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, see Common-
wealth v. Bullard, 465 Pa. 341, 346, 350 A.2d 797, 799 (1976); Commonwealth v. Fleck, 324
Pa. Super. 227, 232, 471 A.2d 547, 549 (1984); Commonwealth v. Watts, 319 Pa. Super. 179,
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held that the prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant's confession was voluntary.2'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first applied this test to a ju-
venile defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights in Commonwealth v.
Darden.22 In Darden, the court held that an inculpatory statement
was admissible when a juvenile defendant had been given Miranda
warnings, had indicated understanding of their significance, and had
indicated that he was willing to answer questions.3 The factors that
the Darden court considered in applying the totality of the circum-
stances test were the defendant's knowledge and understanding of
his Miranda rights, and his physical appearance and condition.24
Balancing the aggregate of factors, the court affirmed the conviction,
holding that the requisite knowledge and understanding were sup-
ported by the totality of factors, thereby compensating for any coer-
cive elements that may have existed.25
One year later in Commonwealth v. Moses," the court reiter-
ated its holding in Darden, stating that the totality of the circum-
stances test included the age, maturity, and intelligence of the de-
fendant involved. In challenging the propriety of the evidentiary
use of the defendant's incriminating oral admissions and written
185, 465 A.2d 1288, 1299 (1983).
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 147, 239 A.2d 426, 429
(1968).
22. 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970).
23. Id. at 50-51, 271 A.2d at 261. After a high school basketball game, a racial fight
broke out between youth groups. A fifteen year-old boy died as a result of a stab wound.
Darden, fifteen years-old, was arrested and charged with the boy's murder. Darden was read
his Miranda rights, whereupon he said that he understood them and was willing to answer
questions. He then made incriminating statements to the effect that he "didn't intend to cut
him [the victim]" but "somehow cut the boy." Id. at 45-46, 271 A.2d at 258-59. The Supreme
Court held that evidence supported the finding that a fifteen year-old defendant, who possessed
an I.Q. of 76 and the mental capacity of an 8 to 1I 1/2 year old, had the required knowledge
and understanding of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present
to render his confession, obtained after four hours of police custody and after two and one-half
hours of questioning in absence of friend or counsel, admissible. Id. at 48, 271 A.2d at 260.
24. Id. at 48-50, 271 A.2d at 260-61. The court found it significant that the juvenile
defendant never denied receiving or understanding his Miranda rights. Id. at 46, 271 A.2d at
259-60. The court noted that Darden had been permitted to rest during the interrogation, and
a police officer, who was also black, was present in the interrogation room. Id. at 44, 271 A.2d
at 258. The court further noted that the trial court described Darden as "remarkably alert,
aware and responsive." Id. at 48 n.3, 271 A.2d at 260 n.3.
25. Id. at 48, 271 A.2d at 260.
26. 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971). Moses and another youth threw firebombs into
the home of a woman who was in her living room watching television. She suffered severe
burns from which complications developed causing her death. Moses was arrested and in-
formed of his constitutional rights. Without hesitation, he proceeded to tell the officer of the
firebombing and his part in it. At the time, Moses was sixteen years-old and did not have the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 351-53, 287 A.2d at 132-33.
27. Id. at 354, 287 A.2d at 133.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1987
statement at trial, defense counsel argued that the right to counsel
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion requires "that counsel be present when a juvenile confesses to a
capital crime."'2 8 The court decided not to apply a per se rule of
inadmissibility. The court noted that special care must be used when
examining the attendant circumstances, but indicated that to apply a
per se rule of inadmissibility regardless of maturity and intelligence
would be "to ignore reality and the sophistication of the average six-
teen year old in these days and times."'29 Pennsylvania courts applied
the totality of the circumstances test in cases involving juvenile de-
fendants until 1974.30
B. The "Interested Adult" Rule: Recognition of the Disadvantage
of Youth
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned the totality of the
circumstances test in Commonwealth v. Roane,3 when a plurality of
the justices held that unless the juvenile defendant had an opportu-
nity prior to making a confession to discuss his rights privately with
an "interested adult," any inculpatory statement would be sup-
pressed.3 2 The court noted that an important factor in establishing
that a juvenile knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional
28. Id. at 353-54, 287 A.2d at 133.
29. Id. at 354, 287 A.2d at 133. Justice Eagen, writing for the majority, stated that:
[W]here the accused is of tender years, the attending circumstances must
be scrutinized with special care. However, to declare as a matter of law that a
sixteen-year old, regardless of maturity and intelligence, is unable to fully under-
stand when he is informed of his constitutional rights and may not by himself
waive his right to counsel before being questioned by the police would be to
ignore reality and the sophistication of the average sixteen-year old in these days
and times.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 459 Pa. 286, 296, 328 A.2d 828, 833 (1974)
(circumstances showed defendant was unable to make intelligent waiver); Commonwealth v.
Cobbs, 452 Pa. 397, 403, 305 A.2d 25, 28 (1973) (juvenile defendant not so intoxicated during
interrogation as to be unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver); In re Betrand, 451
Pa. 381, 389-390, 303 A.2d 486, 491 (1973) (incriminating statement tainted by prior illegal
arrest); Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 158, 295 A.2d 311, 314 (1972) (inculpatory
statement held admissible even though mother was denied permission to be present during
interrogation).
31. 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974). Police arrested sixteen year-old Roane at his
residence in his mother's presence for murder and robbery. The mother followed her son and
the police to the station where she was initially denied access to her son. After entering, unin-
vited, into the interrogation room, she was permitted to talk to her son but the police urged her
to speak loudly enough for them to hear. The mother told the police that she wanted to obtain
an attorney for her son, but this request was ignored. The police then began taking the juve-
nile's formal statement; when the mother protested, a detective responded, "Let him talk,
maybe it will make him feel better." Id. at 392, 329 A.2d at 287.
32. Id. at 393, 329 A.2d at 288.
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rights would be evidence that, before the juvenile made his decision
to waive those rights, he had access to the advice of a parent, attor-
ney, or other adult who was primarily interested in his welfare."3 The
court reasoned that an interested adult would insure that any confes-
sion was not the result of coercion, ignorance of rights, or adolescent
fear. 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the Roane holding
in Commonwealth v. Starkes.36 A plurality of the Starkes court held
that the interested adult must also be advised of the juvenile defend-
ant's constitutional rights before the defendant can make an effective
waiver.36 The court observed that when an informed adult is present
with the juvenile, "the inequality of the position of the accused and
police is to some extent neutralized and due process satisfied."3 In
those instances, however, when the adult "is ignorant of the constitu-
tional rights" of the juvenile suspect and "exerts his or her influence
upon the minor in reaching the decision, it is clear that due process
is offended." 38 The court reasoned that an uninformed adult would
give only the illusion of protection. 9
33. Id. at 394, 329 A.2d at 288. The Roane court held that:
Since ... the Commonwealth first attempted to exclude appellant's mother
from the interrogation and then, when she finally gained access, did not afford
her an opportunity to advise her son privately about his constitutional rights,
although she indicated that she wished him to be afforded the right of counsel
... the Commonwealth failed to establish that appellant's waiver of his rights
was a knowing and intelligent one.
Id. at 396, 329 A.2d at 289.
34. Id. at 394, 329 A.2d at 288 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)).
35. 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975). Fourteen year-old Starkes was suspected of mur-
der and was taken from his home to police headquarters where he was questioned alone by
police for more than an hour. During that time he denied any knowledge of the crime being
investigated. He was allowed to consult privately with his mother, who urged him to tell the
truth. Following the consultation with his mother, the juvenile was questioned again and this
time gave an inculpatory statement. Later, in the presence of his mother, Starkes was advised
of his Miranda rights. He waived them and made a formal confession. Id. at 182, 335 A.2d at
699-700.
36. Id. at 188, 335 A.2d at 703. The court stated: "Where a parent is present we must
at least require that parent to be advised of the rights possessed by the minor suspect before
the parent may be permitted to influence the decision which the minor must make." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The court also discussed the factors that a court should scrutinize to determine the
voluntariness of a waiver. These include the following: the duration and methods of interroga-
tion, the conditions of detention, the manifest attitude of the police toward the defendant, the
defendant's physical and psychological state, and all other conditions present that could serve
to drain the defendant's powers of resistance to suggestion. Id. at 184, 335 A.2d at 701 (citing
Commonwealth v. Alston, 456 Pa. 128, 133-34, 317 A.2d 241, 244 (1974) (evaluation seeking
to determine voluntariness of waiver must consider those elements that would impinge upon a
defendant's will)).
Writing for the plurality, Justice Nix (now Chief Justice) applied a totality of the circum-
stances test. Starkes, 461 Pa. at 184, 335 A.2d at 701. The case has consistently been cited,
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Curiously enough, the court retreated from Starkes in Com-
monwealth v. Klinger,40 decided in the same year. Once again, the
court applied the totality of the circumstances test but indicated that
in the case of a juvenile the facts would be given closer scrutiny.
The court stated that the absence of an interested adult would be
viewed as a factor within the totality of the circumstances and would
weigh heavily against the admissibility of an inculpatory statement.42
The decision in Klinger, however, was an anomaly in the case
law development. Two months later, the court adopted a per se rule
in Commonwealth v. McCutchen,"s that a juvenile defendant's
waiver of Miranda rights was ineffective if made without an oppor-
tunity to first consult with an interested adult." In McCutchen, the
Commonwealth argued that the confession was voluntary because
the defendant had not requested to speak to an interested adult, had
prior experience with the police, was aware of the consequences of
his confession and, therefore, did not require guidance in deciding
whether to confess." Rejecting these arguments, the court reasoned
that the case at bar was not distinguishable from Roane and Starke,
and held that juveniles must have the opportunity to consult with an
however, as one in which the court applied the per se rule. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith,
472 Pa. 492, 498-99, 372 A.2d 797, 801 (1977) (court held that Miranda warnings were
inadequate if the juvenile lacked the opportunity to consult with an interested, informed
adult).
40. 461 Pa. 606, 337 A.2d 569 (1975). Seventeen year old Klinger was arrested by
police in Florida for loitering. He was read his Miranda rights. The police learned that Klinger
was sought by Pennsylvania authorities as a suspect in a homicide. His parents were notified of
his arrest but were not present at the interrogation. Klinger was given Miranda warnings a
second time when informed that he was a suspect and a third time when taken to the interro-
gation room. He then confessed to the murder. Id. at 610, 337 A.2d at 570-71.
41. Id. at 612, 337 A.2d at 571.
42. Id. at 612, 337 A.2d at 572. The court cited both Roane and Starkes for the pro-
position that the absence of an interested adult during questioning of a juvenile would weigh
heavily against a finding of effective waiver. Id. In Klinger, however, the court decided that the
absence of an interested adult was outweighed by the juvenile's age of 17 years and seven
months, his normal maturity and development, the fact that he told the police several times
during the interrogation that he understood his rights, and the lack of physical or psychologi-
cal abuse during the interrogation. Id. at 613, 337 A.2d at 572.
43. 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). At the request
of two police officers, fifteen year old McCutchen went to the station to answer some questions
about a death. He arrived at the station house at 7:00 p.m., was informed of his rights and was
questioned for more than two hours. He was left alone for an hour, and then with his consent,
he underwent a polygraph examination. He was told that the test indicated that he was lying.
He then gave an incriminating statement at 1:10 a.m. At this point the police brought the
defendant's mother to the station. After she was told of her son's confession, she was given the
opportunity to see him. Later, a formal typewritten confession was made by the defendant. Id.
at 92-93, 343 A.2d at 670.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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interested adult before effective waiver could occur.' 6
The per se rule that emerged from this line of cases came to be
known as the "interested adult" rule or the McCutchen Rule. This
rule provided that no person under the age of eighteen years could
waive his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of
counsel without being provided an opportunity to consult with an in-
terested adult who was informed of the juvenile's rights and was in-
terested in the welfare of the juvenile. This rule was followed in an
extensive series of cases.'
C. The Rebuttable Presumption: The Opportunity to Demonstrate
Otherwise
The decisions utilizing the per se rule of McCutchen were far
from unanimous. A dissenting group of justices consistently called
for an end to the McCutchen rule on the grounds that it was overly
paternalistic, unnecessarily protective, and sacrificed the interests of
justice.' 8 The dissenters won a victory of sorts in Commonwealth v.
Veltre'19 when an evenly divided court affirmed a lower court's deci-
sion to admit an inculpatory statement made by a juvenile absent an
46. Id. The court held that since the juvenile defendant had no opportunity to consult
with his mother before waiving his Miranda rights, his confession had to be suppressed.
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 486 Pa. 568, 572, 406 A.2d 1037, 1038-39
(1979) (despite failed attempt by police to contact juvenile defendant's mother and eventual
substitution of prison counselor to serve as interested adult, juvenile had not effectively waived
Miranda rights); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 482 Pa. 555, 561, 394 A.2d 461, 464 (1978) (ju-
venile's rejection of opportunity to consult with his father not an effective waiver); Common-
wealth v. Walker, 477 Pa. 370, 375, 383 A.2d 1253, 1255 (1978) (lack of opportunity to
consult with interested adult constituted psychological coercion; thus, no effective waiver of
Miranda rights); Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 471 Pa. 238, 241, 369 A.2d 1285, 1286 (1977)
(no waiver when juvenile was not permitted to consult with informed parent during interroga-
tion at police station); Commonwealth v. Graver, 473 Pa. 473, 476, 375 A.2d 339, 340 (1977)
(inculpatory statement inadmissible when juvenile lacked opportunity to consult with informed
adult before making confession); Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488, 511, 368 A.2d 1261,
1273 (1977) (no waiver when juvenile lacked opportunity to consult with interested adult until
six hours after questioning); Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401, 404, 368 A.2d 690, 691
(1977) (juvenile had not effectively waived Miranda rights since not permitted to consult with
parents until after informal confession); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 470 Pa. 604, 613, 369
A.2d 1156, 1160 (1977) (juvenile effectively waived rights after opportunity to consult with
mother privately for ten minutes); Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 499-500 , 372 A.2d
797, 801 (1977) (juvenile's waiver not effective when father refused to participate in proceed-
ings); Commonwealth v. Webster, 446 Pa. 314, 328, 353 A.2d 372, 379 (1975) (no effective
waiver when juvenile's mother not informed of son's constitutional rights).
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lawson, 478 Pa. 200, 207, 386 A.2d 509, 512 (1978)
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (per se rule is "an ill-conceived and illogical rule"); Commonwealth
v. Walker, 477 Pa. 370, 377, 383 A.2d 1255, 1256 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by
Jones, J., and Eagen, C.J.) (per se rule is "unwise, unnecessary, and unwarranted"); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 507, 372 A.2d 797, 804 (1977) (Pomeroy J., dissenting, joined
by Eagen, J.) (per se rule "unnecessarily protective and overly paternalistic").
49. 492 Pa. 237, 424 A.2d 486 (1980) (per curiam) (equally divided court; order
affirmed).
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opportunity to consult with an interested adult. 0 Three of the jus-
tices wrote in support of adoption of the totality of the circumstances
test;"1 the remaining three justices supported retention of the per se
rule.52
One year later, the opponents of the per se rule had their oppor-
tunity for review before the United States Supreme Court in Com-
monwealth v. Henderson.5 The Court granted the Commonwealth's
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's determination that the juvenile defendant's confession was
obtained in violation of the per se rule, and remanded the matter for
further consideration in light of Fare v. Michael.54 In Fare, the U.S.
Supreme Court set aside a determination of the California Supreme
Court which held, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that a
statement of a juvenile should have been suppressed on the ground
that the juvenile's request to see his probation officer constituted an
50. Id. at 243-44, 424 A.2d at 489 (Larsen, J., opinion in support of affirmance). The
juvenile defendant had waived his rights after consulting with his probation officer. Id. at 242-
43, 424 A.2d at 487. In a footnote, Justice Larsen acknowledged that a probation officer was
not an "interested adult." Id. at 241 n.3, 424 A.2d at 488 n.3 (citing Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 486 Pa. 568, 406 A.2d 1037 (1979) (prison counselor not an interested adult because
his concern could not be equated with an attorney representing juveniles)).
51. Justice Larsen, writing in support of affirmance and joined by Justices Flaherty and
Kauffman, took the opportunity to support a totality of the circumstances test. He stated that
application of the per se rule "would result in the senseless exclusion of reliable evidence, and
needless repetition of a fair trial." Id. at 243, 424 A.2d at 488.
52. Justice Roberts and Justice Nix both filed opinions in support of reversal. Justice
Roberts, in an opinion joined by then Chief Justice O'Brien, stated that the case law and the
trend in other jurisdictions mandated retention of the per se rule. Id. at 244-45, 424 A.2d at
489-90 (Roberts, J., opinion in support of reversal). Justice Nix elaborated that a probation
officer did not meet the requirements of the per se rule; therefore, the inculpatory statement
should have been suppressed. Id. at 250, 424 A.2d at 492 (Nix, J., opinion in support of
reversal).
In commenting on the Veltre decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that the
precedential value of Veltre was dubious since it involved an evenly split court and was the
first and only departure from the McCutchen rule. In re Miller, 294 Pa. Super. 322, 330, 439
A.2d 1222, 1226 (1982).
53. 266 Pa. Super. 519, 405 A.2d 904 (1979), cert. granted, 446 U.S. 905 (1980), va-
cated and remanded, 446 U.S. 905 (1979) on remand see Commonwealth v. Henderson, 496
Pa. 349, 437 A.2d 387 (1981). Henderson, a fifteen year old youth, was arrested and taken to
the state police barracks. His stepfather refused to go to the barracks. Defendant was unable
to consult with an interested adult, and thus the Superior Court found that defendant's waiver
of his Miranda rights was ineffective because it was not knowingly, intelligently, and volunta-
rily made, even though a trooper explained defendant's rights to his parents and they executed
a written waiver. Id. at 522-23, 405 A.2d at 942.
54. 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Michael C., a sixteen and a half year-old boy, was taken into
custody on suspicion of murder. He had been on probation for four years. At the police station
two police officers began to question him. Prior to waiving his rights, he asked to see his
probation officer, who had earlier advised Michael to contact him in such a situation. Id. at
733 (Powell, J., dissenting). The request was denied. When subsequently asked whether he
wanted to consult an attorney, the juvenile responded, "How I know you guys won't pull no
police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?" The police did not answer the question. Michael
C. then agreed to talk and confessed. Id. at 710-11.
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invocation of his Miranda rights.55 In light of Fare, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court enforced no fed-
eral rights upon the state.5 Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court held
only that the California state court had erroneously imposed greater
restrictions on police conduct than are required by the United States
Constitution.5 7 Thus, on remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that since Fare involved an interpretation of the federal
constitution, it did not disturb the force of the interested adult rule
that was grounded in Pennsylvania state constitutional law. 8
It appeared that the interested adult rule had finally established
itself as the appropriate test to be applied. However, just two years
later in Commonwealth v. Christmas,"' the justices who had opposed
a per se approach made some headway. The court held that when
juvenile defendants waive their Miranda rights without the opportu-
nity to consult with an interested adult who has been informed of the
juvenile's rights, a presumption exists that the waiver was ineffec-
tive." The Commonwealth could rebut this presumption, however,
with evidence that the juvenile knowingly, intelligently, and volunta-
rily waived those rights. 1 The factors that would rebut the presump-
tion of an ineffective waiver include the defendant's age, physical
condition, previous experience with the criminal justice system, and
the presence or absence of physical or psychological coercion during
the interrogation."2 The court reasoned that the protection afforded
juveniles by the per se rule could be achieved in a manner that
afforded:
more adequate weight to the interests of society, and of justice,
while avoiding per se applications of the interested and informed
adult rule that serve[d], in an overly protective and unreasona-
bly paternalistic fashion, to provide means for juvenile offenders
to secure suppression of confessions in fact given in a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary manner."8
55. 442 U.S. at 714.
56. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 496 Pa. 349, 353, 437 A.2d 387, 389 (1981).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 354, 437 A.2d at 389-90.
59. 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983). Seventeen year-old Christmas was arrested for
possession of heroin and taken to the police station and permitted to confer with his father in
private for fifteen minutes. The defendant's father was a police officer. The defendant was
given Miranda warnings in the presence of his father. The defendant then waived his rights
and confessed. Id. at 220, 465 A.2d at 991.
60. Id. at 223, 465 A.2d at 992.
61. Id. at 223, 465 A.2d at 992-93.
62. Id. at 224, 465 A.2d at 992-93.
63. Id. at 223, 465 A.2d at 992.
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D. Return to the "Totality of the Circumstances" Test: Denying
Special Protections
The compromise reached in Christmas was short-lived. In the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's most recent review of uncounseled
waivers by juveniles, Commonwealth v. Williams,"' a majority of the
court held that in determining whether a juvenile defendant effec-
tively waived his or her Miranda rights, courts should apply a total-
ity of the circumstances test, even when the defendant had no oppor-
tunity to consult with an interested adult after Miranda warnings
were given. 65 In so holding, the court abrogated the rebuttable pre-
sumption of ineffective waiver that adhered under the prior case law
and rejected reinstatement of the per se interested adult rule.
The Williams court rejected the Christmas rebuttable presump-
tion rule because it served "no useful analytical purpose."6  The
court held, instead, that the recently created rebuttable presumption
would be replaced by a totality of the circumstances test.7 The court
noted that among the factors to be considered under a totality of the
circumstances test are the juvenile's age, experience, and comprehen-
sion along with the presence or absence of an interested adult.68
Such a test would meet the requirements of due process as it would
sufficiently protect juveniles from the admissibility of involuntary
confessions. 69
64. 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984). Seventeen year old Williams was suspected of
robbery and taken to the police station. At the station the defendant was permitted to talk
briefly in private with his father. Id. at 514 and n.4, 475 A.2d at 1284 and n.4. The police then
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant waived his rights and made an
inculpatory statement. A formal confession was signed by both the defendant and his father.
The trial court granted a motion to suppress the confession on the grounds that the police had
failed to inform the father of the defendant's Miranda rights prior to the private conference
between father and son, and had failed to provide the defendant with an opportunity to consult
with his father privately once both were given the Miranda warnings. Id. at 515, 475 A.2d at
1284-85. The Supreme Court affirmed a reversal, holding that the defendant had made a
knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights since his father was present during the waiver and
confession. Id. at 516, 475 A.2d at 1285 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 309 Pa. Super.
63, 69, 454 A.2d 1083, 1086 (1982) (juvenile effectively waived Miranda rights, despite ab-
sence of private meeting between defendant and his father, when father was interested in de-
fendant's welfare and was informed and aware of defendant's constitutional rights)).
65. 504 Pa. at 521, 475 A.2d at 1287-88.
66. Id. The court stated that the rebuttable presumption merely verified the Common-
wealth's established burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Id. at 521,
475 A.2d at 1288.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. In observing that defendant Williams had considerable experience with the crim-
inal justice system, the court noted that the defendant had been placed on consent decree
probation at age thirteen, was adjudicated delinquent four times, had served probation twice,
and had been committed to a youth detention facility three times. Id. at 522, 475 A.2d at
1288. The record indicated that at the time of the arrest and interrogation the defendant was
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Flaherty stated that the rebut-
table presumption of ineffective waiver articulated in Christmas was
a necessary focus for analysis and should not be overruled. 0 Justice
Flaherty reasoned that the totality of the circumstances test did not
recognize the need to provide a juvenile defendant with an opportu-
nity to consult with an interested adult,"1 whereas the rebuttable pre-
sumption of Christmas balanced the interests of justice with the
needs of juveniles.
Chief Justice Nix, in a dissenting opinion, wrote in support of
the per se rule.7" The chief justice concluded that the totality of the
circumstances test was not sufficient for determining whether a juve-
nile had voluntarily confessed. 74 He argued that a juvenile defend-
ant's immaturity was a unique disadvantage during the interrogation
process, and that mere consideration of the fact of youth in the total-
ity of the circumstances test is inadequate to insure that a juvenile's
waiver was a knowing one. 5 In addition, the chief justice argued
that in practice, the totality of the circumstances test would in effect
place the burden of proving ineffective waiver on the defendant,
when such a burden should rest upon the Commonwealth. 0 Justice
Nix further urged that the per se rule should not be overruled as a
reaction to the "heinous nature of the crimes the juvenile is capable
of committing.
7 7
Justice Zappala, in a separate dissenting opinion, also supported
a return to the per se rule.78 The justice argued that the per se rule
in normal physical condition, of normal intelligence, and was responsive to the questions asked
of him. Id. The court decided that given the defendant's considerable experience with the
criminal justice system, along with his good mental and physical condition, he knowingly, in-
telligently, freely, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that the defendant had been coerced into making an inculpatory statement, and he
had been given some opportunity to consult with his father before confessing. Id.
70. 504 Pa. at 523, 475 A.2d at 1288-89 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 523, 475 A.2d at 1289.
72. Id. Justice Flaherty concluded that the instant circumstances indicated that the ju-
venile's statement was made "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." Id. at 524, 475 A.2d
at 1289.
73. 504 Pa. at 524, 475 A.2d at 1290 (Nix, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Nix stated
that he had reluctantly joined in the Christmas decision in the belief that the rebuttable pre-
sumption of ineffective waiver was preferable to the adoption of the totality of the circum-
stances test. He now reaffirmed his support for the per se rule. Id. at 526, 475 A.2d at 1290.
74. Id. at 525, 475 A.2d at 1290.
75. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 497-99, 372 A.2d 797, 800-01
(1977)).
76. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 558, 296 A.2d 755, 758 (1972)
(Commonwealth has burden of proving knowing and intelligent waiver of rights during police
questioning by preponderance of evidence)).
77. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
78. 504 Pa. at 528, 475 A.2d at 1290 (Zappala, J., dissenting). Justice Zappala joined
in the Christmas decision "to preserve the modicum of protection that the presumption of
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was necessary to balance the disadvantage of the juvenile's immatur-
ity,79 and that the per se rule provided a definite and easily applica-
ble means of protecting the interests of a juvenile suspect.' 0 Thus, in
Williams, the totality of the circumstances test has once again com-
manded the respect of the majority of the court, although, not with-
out strong opposition."
III. Basic Deficiencies in the Present Standard
The totality of the circumstances test adopted in Williams,"2
with its emphasis on the juvenile's age, experience, and comprehen-
sion along with the presence or absence of an interested adult, is
subject to a number of criticisms. The test has been the subject of
debate by many legal commentators and scholars.' 3
A. Failure to Provide the Courts and Police with Guidance
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Williams identified the
factors 4 relevant to the determination of "voluntariness" but de-
incompetency would provide." Id. at 526, 475 A.2d at 1290. Justice Zappala reaffirmed his
support for the per se rule when the majority of the court adopted the totality of the circum-
stances test. Id. at 528, 475 A.2d at 1290.
79. Id. at 527, 475 A.2d at 1291 (citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 482 Pa. 555, 560,
394 A.2d 461, 464 (1978) (consultation with interested adult counterbalances immaturity of
juvenile)). Justice Zappala added that the legislative policy of granting juveniles special pro-
tections is embodied in the Juvenile Act of 1976, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6308 (1982)
(purposes of Juvenile Act include provision of care and protection, and removal of conse-
quences of criminal behavior from children who have committed delinquent acts). Id.
80. Id. at 528, 475 A.2d at 1291 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
81. For cases applying the Williams test see Commonwealth v. McManus, 353 Pa.
Super. 355, 360-61, 509 A.2d 1314, 1317 (1986) (defendant's incriminating statement was
admissible when he was not harshly treated and his uncle, a police officer, was present at time
of waiver); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 347 Pa. Super. 234, 238, 500 A.2d 809, 811 (1985) (de-
fendant's statement found to be voluntarily and intelligently made); Commonwealth v. Hines,
341 Pa. Super. 456, 465-66, 491 A.2d 907, 911-12 (1985) (totality of the circumstances indi-
cated defendant's waiver was voluntary); Commonwealth v. Mancini, 340 Pa. Super. 592, 606,
490 A.2d 1377, 1383-84 (1985) (defendant made valid waiver although he argued he was
intoxicated at the time); Commonwealth v. Bebout, 335 Pa. Super. 275, 281, 484 A.2d 130,
133 (1984) (defendant who met with his mother privately made a valid waiver); Common-
wealth v. Waters, 334 Pa. Super. 513, 521, 483 A.2d 855, 859 (1984) (defendant's confession
was valid even though defendant's father was not present during interrogation).
82. See supra notes 64 and 69.
83. Issacs, The Lawyer in the Juvenile Court, 10 CRIM. L.Q. 222, 231 (1968); Skoler,
The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 43 IND. L.J.
558, 572 (1968); Comment, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77
DICK. L. REV. 543 (1973); Comment, Waiver of Counsel by Minor Defendants, 3 TULSA L.J.
193 (1966); Comment, The Juvenile Offender and Self-incrimination, 40 WASH, L. REV. 189
(1965).
84. 504 Pa. at 521, 475 A.2d at 1288. All of the attending facts and circumstances must
be considered and weighed in determining whether a juvenile's confession was knowingly and
freely given. Among those factors are the juvenile's youth, experience, comprehension, and the
presence or absence of an interested adult. Id.
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clined to give controlling weight to any particular factor, instead re-
mitting the weighing of different factors to the unfettered discretion
of the trial court. 85 Consequently, there are "no clear-cut rules which
could protect a child who is not as mature or knowledgeable as an
adult, [and] courts are left without clear touchstones by which to
evaluate a particular confession." ' 6 In rejecting the totality of the
circumstances test, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the test
"tends to mire the courts in a morass of speculation similar to that
from which Miranda was designed to extricate them in adult
cases."
87
The biggest overall problem with the test, however, is that it
gives little guidance to police in their task of determining whether a
particular juvenile is competent to waive his Miranda rights. Indeed,
the factors invoked in the totality of the circumstances test have
been characterized as "amorphous, illusive, and largely unreview-
able." 8 The probable result of this fact is that police will seek a
waiver in all cases and force the courts to make an after-the-fact
determination as to the propriety of the waiver. Case law from New
York89 and New Jersey9" is illustrative. In each instance, police had
obtained waivers and confessions from juveniles approximately ten
years old, and the courts held them invalid.9 The very fact that the
police even presumed that children of such young age could compe-
tently waive their rights demonstrates the need for a more concrete
standard. The notion that a waiver and confession should be strenu-
ously sought in every case, in the hope that later judicial scrutiny
will uphold the waiver, is constitutionally suspect. As the Indiana
Supreme Court noted in Lewis v. Indiana,92 even if the police did
wish to honestly assess a juvenile's comprehension and ability to
85. Id.
86. Comment, Juvenile Confessions: Whether State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally
Permissible Confessions, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 196 (1976). See also Grisso,
Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
1134, 1138-89 (1980) [hereinafter Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights] ("There is
no case law ...which suggests how to evaluate all the considerations systematically. The
manner in which the factors are weighed and combined has always been a matter of judicial
discretion.").
87. In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 591 (La. 1978) (adopting an interested or informed adult
rule).
88. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867-71 (1981)
(reviewing Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
POLICY (1980)).
89. In re Kevin R., 42 A.D.2d 541, 345 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1973).
90. In re S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972).
91. 42 A.D.2d at 541, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 12; 61 N.J. at 115-16, 293 A.2d at 185.
92. 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
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waive his constitutional rights, the courts have provided little guid-
ance as to a constitutionally acceptable procedure. "3
B. The Factors To Be Considered Possess Questionable Reliability
When viewed separately, the factors that a judge is to consider
in the totality of the circumstances fail to provide clear indications of
a juvenile's incompetence to make a voluntary and intelligent waiver.
1. Age.-The age of the juvenile suspect may be an entirely
irrelevant factor for a judge when the totality of the circumstances
are weighed. This seems to be especially true when the juvenile is
between twelve and sixteen years of age. A review of cases from ju-
risdictions that have applied the totality of the circumstances test
reveals that an understanding of Miranda warnings was considered
to be lacking in almost all of the cases which involved juveniles of
twelve years of age or younger.94 In contrast, understanding was
found to be sufficient in about three-quarters of the cases of juveniles
sixteen to nineteen years of age.95 Cases involving the intermediate
ages of 13, 14, and 15 were more variable in outcome than the latter
groups and produced more dissenting opinions by judges.96 This sur-
93. Id. at 436, 288 N.E,2d at 141-42. See also In Re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 591
(La. 1978).
94. See People v. Baker, 9 I1. App.3d 654, 292 N.E.2d 760 (1973); C.W., Jr. v. Mur-
phy, 508 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1974); In re S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972); In re
Kevin R., 42 A.D.2d 541, 345 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1973).
95. See United States ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 228 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Pa. 1964);
United States ex rel. Lynch v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Doerr v. State, 348
So.2d 938 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1977); State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541, 552 P.2d 905 (1976);
People v. Stanis, 41 Mich. App. 565, 200 N.W.2d 473 (1972); State v. McConnell, 529 S..2d
185 (Mo. App. 1975); State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975).
96. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972); Thomas v. North Carolina,
447 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1971); Lopez v. United States, 399 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1968); Parker
v. State, 351 So.2d 927 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Toney, 113 Ariz. 404, 555 P.2d 650
(1976); In re Estrada, I Ariz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 1 (1965); In re P., 7 Cal.3d 801, 500 P.2d 1,
103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972); Tennell v. State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Wil-
liams v. State, 238 Ga. 298, 232 S.E.2d 535 (1977); Riely v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d
922 (1976); M.K.H. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 565, 218 S.E.2d 284 (1975); People v. Carpenter,
38 I1. App.3d 435, 347 N.E.2d 781 (1976); In re Morgan, 35 II1. App.3d 10, 341 N.E.2d 19
(1975); In re Stiff, 32 Ill. App.3d 971, 336 N.E.2d 619 (1975); State ex rel. Holifield, 319
So.2d 471 (La. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972);
Coney v. State, 491 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1973); State v. White, 494 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. App.
1973); People v. King, 27 Mich. App. 619, 183 N.W.2d 843 (1970); In re L., 29 A.D. 182,
287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968); Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970). Of the 25,688 juvenile cases
disposed of by the Pennsylvania courts in 1984, 43% of the juveniles were between the ages of
12-15, the age group most difficult to predict the judge's decision as to whether a defendant of
that age is capable of waiving his constitutional rights. JUVENILE COURT JUDGES' COMMISSION,
PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS 20-21 (1984) [hereinafter Juvenile Court
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vey suggests that age itself is quite limited in its effectiveness as a
guide for judges in weighing decisions about a juvenile's
understanding.
Furthermore, while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized
the age of the child in Williams as a crucial factor,97 it failed to
consider sufficiently the related disadvantage of immaturity. This is
probably because the inadequate judgment of an adolescent is very
difficult to measure. For example, a precocious eleven year old may
very well be more aware of his rights than an eighteen year old.
2. Prior Experience.-As with the age of the juvenile, prior
experience with the criminal court system does not necessarily ap-
pear to be an accurate indication of a valid waiver. Generally, courts
have considered a juvenile's lack of prior contacts with police and
the judicial system as weighing against sufficient understanding of
Miranda warnings, especially when viewed in combination with
other variables supporting such a conclusion." Similarly, extensive
prior experience has been cited by judges as suggesting greater un-
derstanding of Miranda warnings due to more frequent exposure to
them and familiarity with court experiences." Empirical studies,
however, suggest that a juvenile's experience does not always equate
with adequate knowledge of Miranda rights.100 In fact, it has been
posited that the emotionally arousing conditions under which
juveniles are exposed to the warnings during arrest might inhibit or
impair incidental learning of the warnings.101 While repetition may
lead to familiarity at times, in these circumstances it is not self-evi-
dent that it leads to the understanding of one's constitutional rights.
3. Intelligence.-The intelligence of the juvenile suspect is
perhaps the only valid factor involved in the assessment of whether a
juvenile made a valid waiver, but it is only partially accurate. 02 The
inherent problem with this factor is that it is not specific enough to
Dispositions].
97. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 521, 475 A.2d 1283, 1288 (1984).
98. See, e.g., Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Simon v. Maroney, 228 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Pa. 1964); In re P., 7 Cal.3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 103
Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972); Commonwealth v. Cain, 361 Mass. 224, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972).
99. See, e.g., State v. Toney, 113 Ariz. 404, 555 P.2d 650 (1976); In re Morgan, 35 Ill.
App. 3d 10, 341 N.E.2d 19 (1975); Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283
(1984); State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970).
100. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
101. T. Grisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPE-
TENCE 90-91 (1981) [hereinafter JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS].
102. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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give the interrogating officer guidance as to the threshold level of
intelligence required. It is highly unlikely that the average police of-
ficer could adequately gauge a juvenile's intelligence to accurately
determine whether a knowing and intelligent waiver could be made.
Without proper testing of reading and comprehension ability, a juve-
nile's intelligence is too much of an unknown to be used in judging
the waiver of important constitutional rights."0 3
A cursory review of cases in which intelligence quotient (IQ)
scores of juvenile defendants were in evidence indicates that a rela-
tionship between judges' decisions and IQ scores of juveniles in-
volved does indeed exist. In all of the cases in which requisite under-
standing of warnings was considered to be lacking, the juveniles had
IQ scores of below 75.104 On the other hand, the courts have consist-
ently viewed understanding to be adequate in cases where IQ scores
above 75 were entered as evidence of the juvenile's competence. 0 5
C. The Test May Be Discriminatory in Effect
The multitude of factors implicated by the "totality" ap-
proach,106 the lack of guidelines as to how the various factors should
be weighed, 07 and the myriad combinations of factual situations
that may occur make almost every case of juvenile waiver unique.
The case-by-case approach necessitated by the totality of the cir-
103. See Stricker, Psychological Assessment and Miranda Rights, 49 J. OF PERSONAL-
ITY ASSESSMENT 656 (1985); Wulach, The Assessment of Competency to Waive Miranda
Rights, J. OF LAW & PSYCHIATRY 209 (1981) (providing a methodology for assessment of
understanding of Miranda rights).
104. See, e.g., Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1972); Thomas v. North Caro-
lina, 447 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 228 F. Supp.
800 (W.D. Pa. 1964); United States ex rel. Lynch v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
In re P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972); People v. Baker, 9 Ill. App. 3d
654, 292 N.E.2d 760 (1973); State ex rel. Holifield, 319 So.2d 471 (La. App. 1975); People v.
Stanis, 41 Mich. App. 565, 200 N.W.2d 473 (1972); Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa.
225, 307 A.2d 922 (1973).
105. Parker v. State, 351 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Toney, 113 Ariz.
404, 555 P.2d 650 (1976); People v. Carpenter, 38 Ill. App.3d 435, 347 N.E.2d 781 (1976); In
re Stiff, 32 Ill. App.3d 971, 336 N.E.2d 619 (1975); Coney v. State, 491 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.
1973); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970).
106. See supra note 84. See also West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
1968). In West, the court set forth the following comprehensive set of circumstances to be
considered in determining the validity of a minor's waiver of Miranda rights: age of the ac-
cused; education of the accused; knowledge of the accused as to both the substance of the
charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and
remain silent; whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives,
friends, or an attorney; whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges
had been filed; methods used in interrogation; length of interrogations; whether the accused
had refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and whether the accused had
repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date. Id.
107. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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cumstances test can not help but result in unequal treatment among
juveniles similarly situated. This is because "assessments of how the
totality of the circumstances affected a juvenile in a particular case
can never be more than speculation."'' 08 This can result only in un-
limited and unreviewable judicial discretion.10' Thus, when the Wil-
liams court's totality of the circumstances test is viewed in its proce-
dural context, it appears to exclude only the most egregiously
obtained confessions, and then only on a haphazard basis." 0 With
something as important as fundamental rights at stake, such a result
should be actively avoided. What is needed is a fair and consistent
standard of application to all juveniles."'
IV. Minors Lack the Capacity to Make Decisions of Legal
Significance
A. Pennsylvania Law Protects the Minor in Civil Matters
Permitting juveniles to make voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waivers of their basic constitutional rights is inconsistent with the
protections afforded to minors in civil matters. Under the Pennsylva-
nia Rules of Civil Procedure," 2 minors are unable to enter legal
transactions and are presumed to lack the requisite intelligence to
make a valid waiver."' Minors are considered incapable of engaging
108. In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 591 (La. 1978).
109. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 88, at 202; Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda
Rights, supra note 86, at 1138-89. Indeed, in Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707 (1979), there
were substantial divisions within the Court over the totality of the circumstances test as ap-
plied to the facts in the case itself. Both dissenting opinions concluded that the youth did not
understand the rights he purportedly waived. Compare 442 U.S. at 724-27 (the youth made an
intelligent waiver) with id. at 733-34 (Powell, J. dissenting) (discussing evidence suggesting
that the youth did not understand his rights) and at 730 & 730, n.1 (Marshall, J. dissenting)
(the police did not attempt to allay the youth's concern that the police would erroneously tell
him that a police officer was an attorney in order to elicit information).
110. A review of the cases of other jurisdictions applying a totality of the circumstances
tests reveals that only rarely will the court find that a juvenile's waiver is invalid. See, e.g.,
People v. Baker, 9 III. App.3d 654, 292 N.E.2d 670 (1973) (15-year-old, IQ of 72, first grade
reading level, non-functional student). The cases examined, supra notes 94-96 indicate that
juvenile confessions typically are admitted by trial courts, and only under extreme circum-
stances will those admissions be overturned on appeal. See Thomas v. North Carolina, 447
F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1971) (15-year-old, IQ of 72, fifth grade dropout, 19 hours of incommuni-
cado interrogation, not taken before a judge for two days, and not given adequate explanation
of his constitutional rights); In re Estrada, I Ariz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 1 (1965) (14-year-old,
low education and literacy, serious and complex charges, hasty proceedings); In re P., 7 Cal.
3d 801, 500 P.2d I, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972) (14-year-old, retarded, immature, first of-
fender).
S11. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
112. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to minors in civil actions are
contained in 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2026-2039 (1982).
113. See infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
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in litigation on their own behalf.114 If sued, the juvenile needs a
court-appointed guardian to act as his representative in the suit. 1
Juveniles are considered incapable of waiving any rights in such pro-
ceedings, and the guardian ad litem may not waive any substantial
rights of the minor or make any admission against the interest of the
juvenile.116 A judgment obtained without the appointment of a
guardian ad litem is voidable.
1 1 7
In many civil matters, a minor is considered to be legally incom-
petent. Because of their age and immaturity, children are thought to
be incapable of protecting their own interests.118 Statutory and judi-
cial laws have developed in Pennsylvania to protect a child's personal
and property rights.1 9 The legal disability of minors has been firmly
114. 42 PA. CONS. STAT § 2027 (1982) provides that: "When a minor is party to an
action he shall be represented by a guardian who shall supervise and control the conduct of the
action in behalf of the minor." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2031(b) (1982) requires that:
If a minor party to an action is not represented, the court shall appoint a
guardian for him either upon its own motion or upon the petition of (1) the
minor party, (2) a guardian of the minor appointed by any court of competent
jurisdiction, or by a will duly probated, (3) any relative of the minor, or (4) any
other party to the action.
See also Herron v. Piantone, 95 Montg. 290 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1972) and Mitchell v. Mitchell, 29
Beaver 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1968) (discussing purposes of Pa. R. Civ. P. 2027 and 2031); 43
C.J.S. Infants § 222 (1978).
115. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 222 (1978).
116. See Smith v. Smith, 56 Pa. D. & C. 279 (1946) (guardian ad litem may not waive
proof of the qualifications of an expert witness); In re Gingrich's Estate, 57 Dauph. 102 (Pa.
Orphans' Ct. 1945) (guardian ad litem has authority to protect the interest of his ward, but
never has authority to consent to anything prejudicial to his ward); In re Mark's Estate, 38 Pa.
D. & C. 489 (Orphans' Ct. 1940) (duty of a guardian ad litem to defend every legal right
possessed by the persons whom he represents; he has no authority to surrender any right or
property of such persons without consideration regardless of his natural sympathies for other
parties). See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2039 (1982) (protects the rights of minors in the
settlement of their claims by requiring court approval).
117. See, e.g., Vietro v. Ott, 33 North. 401, 17 Som. 306, 69 York 149, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d
595 (1956) (a verdict, judgment or decree will be set aside and a new trial granted when
minor defendant is not represented by a guardian); Roll v. Beadling, 33 West. 247 (Pa. Com.
Pl. 1951) (It is the duty of court to see that proceedings are held in abeyance until a guardian
is appointed and ordinarily, when no guardian is present, a verdict, judgment, or decree will be
set aside.).
118. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 108 (1978); see also supra notes 113-115, 118.
119. See Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395 (1957) (standard of care appli-
cable to a minor differs from that applicable to an adult); In re O'Learys' Estate, 352 Pa. 254,
42 A.2d 624 (1945) (a minor is not competent to contract); Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super.
523, 489 A.2d 764 (1985) (discussing purposes of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301-06); Keith v. Keith, 28 Pa. D. & C.3d 462 (1984) (application of
the Protection from Abuse Act to father-son situation); In re Garrison's Estate, 14 Lebanon
333, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (1974) (Orphans' Court has mandatory exercise of jurisdiction in
the administration and distribution of the real and personal property of minors' estates). See
also the following statutes that regulate actions of minors prior to their 18th birthday: 20 PA.
CONs. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (Purdon 1975) (making a will); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2811
(Purdon 1963) (marriage); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2621 (Purdon 1967) (wager at race
tracks); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 48.3 (Purdon 1964) (drive trucks, ambulances and other
official fire vehicles), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5945 (1982) (may not waive testimonial privilege
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established in both case law and statute for their protection. 120
These limitations on a minor's capabilities are based on the in-
ability of children to understand the consequences of their acts. It
follows that a juvenile must be similarly protected against an im-
provident waiver of his constitutional rights. For a waiver to be con-
stitutionally permissible, the juvenile must understand the full im-
pact of waiving his rights. The law in almost all civil areas has
assumed that the child is not capable of so understanding and has
therefore placed restrictions on the child's ability to manage his own
affairs until age eighteen.' The waiver of constitutional rights has
far more serious consequences than the other acts that the minor is
prohibited from doing in the civil context.'
B. Personal Characteristics of Many Juvenile Suspects Show A
Lack of Capacity
The limitations on a minor's capabilities observed by the civil
law should apply with equal force to constitutional waivers. Juvenile
offenders typically are characterized by low socioeconomic status, 2 '
intellectual deficiency,' 24 inadequate home background, 25 and resi-
protecting confidential statements to school personnel); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1311.316
(Purdon 1967) (may not hunt without adult supervision until age sixteen).
120. See supra note 119.
121. See supra note 122. As one court noted:
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an accepted
legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and protected status in
our legal system. There are legally and socially recognized differences between
the presumed responsibility of adults and minors . . . . [M]inors are unable to
execute a binding contract ... , [and] unable to convey real property ..... It
would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the state deems
incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages ... , or even
donate their own blood ... , should be compelled to stand on the same footing
as an adult when asked to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at
a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.
Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 437-38, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141-42 (1972) (citations omitted).
The same factors of age and relative immaturity that have resulted in various legal doc-
trines to protect minors from their own incapacity would appear to apply to waivers of consti-
tutional rights and their attendant consequences as well. If children are legally incapable of
making a contract, executing a valid will, or entering into a marriage, the disability should also
attend the making of incriminating statements.
122. Whereas activities in which minors are prohibited from engaging may result in
voidance or a minimal penalty, the waiver of constitutional rights and the making of a confes-
sion may result in imprisonment for a term of years.
123. J. HOPKINS, ADOLESCENCE 349 (1983). Of the 25,688 juvenile cases disposed of in
Pennsylvania in 1984, 69% of the juveniles came from families with an income below $16,000,
and 34% of the juveniles lived in households with an income of $8,000 or less. Juvenile Court
Dispositions, supra note 99 at 32.
124. J. HOPKINS, supra note 123 at 354-55. Of the 25,688 juvenile cases disposed of in
Pennsylvania in 1984, 67% of the juveniles had not completed schooling beyond ninth grade.
Juvenile Court Dispositions, supra note 96, at 27.
125. J. HOPKINS, supra note 123 at 348-49. Of the 25,688 juvenile cases disposed of in
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dence in an undesirable neighborhood. 12 6 These factors can represent
a significant barrier to comprehension that goes beyond problems
based on mere youth.
Developmental psychologists have established characteristics of
the juvenile's personality that are useful in the waiver context. Jean
Piaget has described the adolescent as one with little foresight, who
does not consider all possibilities before he acts.12  According to
Piaget, the child's understanding is limited to things that are availa-
ble to immediate perception. 2 When these characteristics of an ad-
olescent are overlaid on a juvenile-suspect-interrogator framework, it
is readily discernible that the juvenile is not in control of his situa-
tion. All the juvenile knows is that he is caught by the police, and he
is not likely to be aware of the specific consequences of his acts.'29
Poor educational attainment is one of the most prominent char-
acteristics of a juvenile delinquent. 80 Children from low-income
homes have been shown to be deficient in both perceptual and cogni-
tive development and in language.' 1' Families in socioeconomically
deprived groups provide children with different cognitive and lan-
guage experiences and put much less stress on values of intellectual
development and achievement. 132
A juvenile with low cognitive development often lacks the word
skills necessary to understand simple concepts, let alone abstract
ones. 3' Understanding one's constitutional rights involves highly ab-
stract reasoning. 34 A child who is intellectually deficient lacks the
capacity to understand abstract distinctions.'35 Understanding is also
made more difficult by the fact that the juvenile's constitutional
rights are being related by an authoritative figure whom he has the
Pennsylvania in 1984, 67% of the juveniles were from households of four or more members,
and 62% of the juveniles were living with one parent or no parents. Juvenile Court Disposi-
tions, supra note 99, at 29-30.
126. R. JOHNSON & G. MENDINNUS, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 627-28 (1969).
127. H. GINSBURG & S. OPPER, PIAGET'S THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
202-206 (1969).
128. Id. at 202-03.
129. See infra notes 143-70 and accompanying text (empirical research indicates that
juveniles readily waive their rights and confess).
130. J. HOPKINS, supra note 123, at 354-55.
131. P. MUSSEN, BASIC AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
350 (1975).
132. Hess & Shipman, Early Experiences and the Socialization of Cognitive Modes in
Children, noted in 36(4) CHILD DEVELOPMENT 869 (1965).
133. J. HOPKINS, supra note 123, at 144-54.
134. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text (Juveniles failed to adequately para-
phrase each of the four Miranda warning statements and define six words from the Miranda
warnings.).
135. J. HOPKINS, supra note 123, at 144-45, 150.
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most reason to fear and distrust. 3 '
In considering these cognitive obstacles faced by juveniles, one
commentator concluded: "The obvious source of incompetence to be
expected of a [juvenile] is simply inability to comprehend. Immatur-
ity, illiteracy and inexperience are concomitants of youth."'1 37
C. Empirical Research Suggests that Most Juveniles Do Not Un-
derstand their Miranda Rights
Empirical research evaluating juveniles' understanding of their
Miranda rights indicates that most juveniles who receive Miranda
warnings may not understand them well enough to waive their con-
stitutional rights in a "knowing and intelligent" manner.3 8 A recent
and comprehensive examination of juveniles' understanding of Mi-
randa warnings was undertaken by Thomas Grisso and his col-
leagues in the Department of Psychology at the University of St.
Louis. 139  The researchers performed a series of meticulously
designed studies of the circumstances under which juveniles waive
their rights in delinquency proceedings and of their comprehension
of fifth and sixth amendment rights. 40
1. Prevailing Interrogation Practices.-In order to obtain data
on what juveniles actually do when presented with the opportunity to
waive Miranda rights, Grisso examined Saint Louis County Juvenile
Court records for a three year period.' 4 ' Interrogation of juveniles
136. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text,
137. Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Minors: A Question of Law or Fact?, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 223, 225 (1967).
138. See generally Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 39 (1970). In this study, juveniles were interviewed in circumstances similar to that of a
police custodial interrogation. One-half of the 90 juveniles were given formal Miranda warn-
ings and one-half were given a simplified warning. After receiving a waiver and learning that
the juvenile was willing to talk, the interviewer measured how many of the elements in the
Miranda warning that the juvenile was able to identify. The researchers concluded that 94% of
the juveniles did not intelligently relinquish a known right. Only four juveniles had a perfect
score of understanding. Even more significant, only 27% of the youths comprehended that they
had a right to an attorney during interrogation. Id. But see Juvenile's Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights. supra note 86, at 1143 n.50 (Because of flaws in the methodology of the
Ferguson and Douglas study, a clear view of juveniles' abilities to understand the various
warnings cannot be obtained from the results.).
139. Grisso and Promicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Proce-
dures. Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, I LAW & HUM. BEI-HAV. (1977) [hereinafter Interroga-
tion of Juveniles]. Professor Grisso's studies are intended to give judges an empirical basis for
evaluation of factors in the totality, to assist judicial and legislative policy makers in determin-
ing needs for special protections of juveniles in the interrogation setting, and to provide attor-
neys with an understanding of the expectations and beliefs of their juvenile clients. JUVENILES'
WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 204.
140. See infra notes 141-75, 211-25 and accompanying text.
141. See Interrogation of Juveniles, supra note 142, at 321. The particular time period
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charged with felonies was found to be commonplace, apparently oc-
curring in more than 60% of the cases.14 Moreover, when interro-
gated, juveniles generally "talked."14 Juveniles under age fifteen vir-
tually never invoked their rights; older juveniles age fifteen and
sixteen did so somewhat more frequently.'44 These rates of assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination were sub-
stantially lower than those reported previously in studies of adult
'415waivers.
The rate of waivers was not related to the degree of procedural
safeguards in place.146 That is, juveniles were no more likely to in-
voke the right to silence in 1976 than in the previous two years, al-
though police behavior had in fact changed. 4" Perhaps the reason
for the lack of change was that juveniles were typically represented
by their parents alone without benefit of counsel during the interro-
gation.148 Nevertheless, it seems clear from Grisso's data that for
most juveniles the Miranda rights are practically meaningless. Chil-
dren under the age of fifteen especially behave as if they are com-
pelled to confess and do so without the benefit of advice from an
attorney.
41
2. Competency to Waive Rights.-Grisso's study casts doubt
on the "voluntariness" of juveniles' waivers of rights. In addition to
the question of voluntariness, however, there are questions of the ca-
pacity of juveniles to meet the "knowing" and "intelligent" require-
ments of the competency standard to make a valid waiver. Data
reveals that juveniles fourteen years of age and younger are substan-
tially less likely than adults to understand Miranda rights and pre-
sumably, therefore, to make competent judgments concerning waiv-
studied is of interest because Missouri adopted new juvenile procedural rules in December
1975; the new rules required the presence of a court officer and the juvenile's parent or legal
counsel during interrogation if an admission was to be admissible. Id. at 325.
142. Id. at 330. The sample consisted of 491 juvenile cases. Id. at 327.
143. Id. at 332-333. "Talking" was defined as the existence of information in a police
report provided by the juvenile, other than mere identification information. Id.
144. Id. at 337 (12% to 14% of interrogations).
145. Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1521
(1967) (23 out of 127 interrogations, or 18.1% of adult suspects resulted in suspects' refusal to
talk); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh: A Statistical Study, 29 PITT. L. REV. 1
(1967) (Refusal to talk was reported in 42.7% of the 173 adult interrogation cases.).
146. After the procedural change, police were in fact more likely to ensure that a court
representative and a parent were present during interrogation of juveniles. Interrogation of
Juveniles, supra note 144, at 330-332.
147. Id.
148. Attorneys were present in only 3% of the cases. Id. at 331.
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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ers of rights.150 Like the younger juveniles, subjects fifteen and
sixteen years-old with IQs less than eighty appeared to demonstrate
incompetence to waive their rights, both in absolute terms and in
relative terms in relation to adults. 15 1 Fifteen and sixteen year-olds
with IQs above eighty also often lacked competent understanding of
Miranda rights,152 but this proportion was similar to that found in
the adult groups. 153 Moreover, contrary to the assumption of many
courts,' experience with the juvenile or criminal justice system
bears no direct relationship to understanding one's constitutional
rights.1
55
In a study of juveniles' understanding of Miranda vocabulary,
Grisso used Wechsler-type scoring (0,1,2) of definitions of six words
from the standard Miranda warning. 56 The criteria for an adequate
(2) and an inadequate (0) score were derived after pilot testing and
consultation with both attorneys and law professors on both local
and national panels. 57 Almost two-thirds of the juvenile sample re-
ceived zero credit on one or more items. 15 8 Only 15.3% of the
juveniles received a total score of 11 or 12.'59 In contrast, 37.4% of
offender adults and 35.6% of nonoffender adults showed such under-
standing. 60 Thus, while many adults showed gaps in knowledge of
Miranda vocabulary, these gaps were substantially more common
among juveniles. Relatively speaking, ignorance of most of the words
tested was especially common among juveniles. Only 8% of offender
adults and 3.5% of nonoffender adults obtained scores of 6 or below;
on the other hand, 26.3% of juveniles manifested such lack of knowl-
edge."6' Results of a study conducted on the comprehension of the
Miranda warnings were similar.' 62
150. Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 88, at 1160-61; see
discussion of experiments in text accompanying notes 156-75.
151. Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1152.
152. About one-third to one-half of the sample lacked competent understanding of their
Miranda rights. Id. at 1160.
153. Id. at 1165.
154. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
155. Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1166.
156. The words to be defined included consult, attorney, interrogation, appoint, entitled,
and right. Id. at 1146.
157. Id. at 1144.
158. Id. For the studies discussed in this section, juvenile participants were being held in
detention (n=359) or were living in boys town or juvenile correctional facilities (n=72). The
adult samples consisted of 203 offenders living in halfway houses and 57 nonoffenders with
inner-city or working-class backgrounds. Id. at 1149-50.
159. Id. at 1153.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Researchers asked the same subjects to explain each of the stated Miranda rights.
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In an interview with the juveniles concerning the function of
rights in interrogation, researchers found two basic misunderstand-
ings to be common among juveniles.1" First, many juveniles per-
ceived the right to silence as revocable by the police or the judge;
they believed that juveniles who asserted such a right should be pe-
nalized for doing so.164 Second, juveniles tended to perceive the legal
system as inquisitorial. 165
Thomas Grisso's latest study, an examination of juveniles' rea-
soning about the waiver decision, was based on Spivack and Shure's
theory of problem solving abilities.166 The participants]67 were asked
to generate alternative courses of action for hypothetical juveniles in
interrogation and to evaluate the possible consequences of several
suggested alternatives.6 6 When asked to imagine all of the alterna-
tive responses, approximately 40% of the participants did not men-
tion invoking the right to silence, even when the option was men-
tioned in the text of the hypothetical situation.'6" The perception
that the fifth amendment privilege really is a choice is apparently
questionable for many juveniles; the high proportion of waivers of
the right to silence is indicative of this disbelief or
Their responses were scored "adequate" (2 points), "questionable" (I point), and "inade-
quate" (0 points). Id. at 1144. Scores of 7 or 8 were attained by 69.2% of the adults but by
only 39.0% of the juveniles. Id. at 1152. Two of the warnings were particularly difficult for the
juveniles to understand. About 25% of the juveniles, in comparison with 8.5% of the adults,
received "0" credit for the explanation of the warning, "Anything you say can and will be held
against you in a court of law." Id. at 1154. Almost half of the juveniles (44.8%) and 14.6% of
the adults gave "0" point responses in their explanation of the warning, "You are entitled to
consult with an attorney before interrogation and to have an attorney present at the time of
the interrogation." Id. Lack of understanding of the word "interrogation" was apparently the
source of much of the misunderstanding; it was frequently confused with the court hearing. Id.
163. Researchers asked the same sample of juvenile and adult subjects in a structured
interview to respond to an artist's drawing of an interrogation scene, an attorney-defendant
consultation, and a courtroom scene. Each drawing was labeled as to the event and the charac-
ters; the characters' facial expressions and postures were neutral. Each subject was then asked
a set of five questions designed to assess his perceptions of the relevant critical area. Id. at
1148.
164. Id. at 1158. More juveniles (61.8%) than adults (21.7%) failed to recognize that a
judge cannot penalize someone for invoking his right to silence. Id.
165. About 28% of the juveniles assumed that attorneys owed a duty to the juvenile
court that interfered with the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. One-quarter to
one-third of the juveniles believed that the advocacy potential of the attorney-client relation-
ship could not be realized when the lawyer was aware of the juvenile's guilt. Id.
166. Juveniles' Waiver of Rights, supra note 101, at 133. Spivak and Shure have devel-
oped a model for examining the effectiveness of problem-solving in adapting to interpersonal
problem situations. See generally G. SPIVAK & M. SHURE, SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT OF YOUNG
CHILDREN: A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO SOLVING REAL-LIFE PROBLEMS (1974).
167. The subjects were 183 juveniles who were residents of the same three settings from
which samples were drawn in the previous two studies discussed. Juveniles' Waiver of Rights,
supra note 101, at 139.
168. Id. at 142.
169. Id. at 143.
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misunderstanding.17 0
Most of the participants did recommend obtaining counsel in
response to the hypothetical situations, although they questioned the
need for attorneys in some circumstances.17' This finding is in stark
contrast to what juveniles actually do. In Grisso's study of court
records, the right to counsel was rarely asserted during interrogation
of juveniles. 72 While Grisso interprets this disparity in terms of the
interference of emotions aroused at that time with effective decision-
making, 73 it is at least as plausible that the lack of invocation of the
right is a reflection of how adolescents perceive reality in such situa-
tions. An adolescent is not often given the opportunity to engage an
adult professional on his behalf. Regardless of the language of the
Miranda warning, it is unlikely that many juveniles perceive such an
action to be both socially acceptable and indeed an entitlement, par-
ticularly when their parents do not encourage invoking the right to
counsel or actively discourage engaging an attorney.'
7 4
In view of the fact that Grisso and his colleagues demonstrated
critical gaps in understanding of Miranda rights in relatively low-
pressure settings, Grisso's work leads to the "inescapable conclusion"
that at least young juveniles under the age of fifteen, and possibly all
juveniles, require special protections during interrogation.
7 5
V. Pressures of the Interrogation and Waiver
The following discussion analyzes the voluntariness of juvenile
waivers from the perspective of both the internal and external pres-
sures acting upon the juvenile when in police custody and subjected
to interrogation.
A. Police Interrogation Tactics
It is claimed that police interrogations of juveniles are inher-
ently coercive because of the authoritative position of police and the
threatening aura of police stations, in contrast to the powerlessness
and potential vulnerability of many juveniles. 7 The potential for the
danger of coercion seems to reside more in the subtle uses of this
170. Of those subjects who recognized the right to remain silent or the right to a lawyer
for a situation in which a child was being questioned by police about a robbery, 83.4% of the
juveniles recommended that the child waive his rights and confess. Id. at 143-144.
171. Id. at 143.
172. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
173. Juveniles' Waiver of Rights, supra note 101, at 147.
174. See infra notes 207-21 and accompanying text.
175. Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1161.
176. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3-14 (1980).
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power difference by police than in physical abuse or overt threat.1"
Consistent with the philosophy that the police as well as the
court1 78 are to work in the best interests of the child, most police
manuals encourage friendly and concerned questioning.1 79 Manuals
generally note that such questioning methods are not only more hu-
mane, but also more effective in obtaining a suspect's cooperation
than are methods that may arouse defensiveness. 80 One such man-
ual suggests that police begin by expressing to the juvenile their in-
terest in his or her welfare, and then should encourage the juvenile
to cooperate and to provide as many details as possible. 8 ' The inter-
rogation is approached as an opportunity to relieve oneself of guilt
feelings so that treatment efforts can begin. 82 Police are told that "a
review of facts as you know them can help [the juvenile] to admit
participation in the offense.' 8 3 Juveniles are also urged to admit to
any other offenses so they "can continue with a clean slate.'
' 84
There is no data to indicate the degree to which these textbook
descriptions of police interrogation procedures are practiced by
Pennsylvania's police officers, nor have the probable range of police
interrogation styles been systematically observed and documented.
Thus, the potential benefits and hazards of such "friendly" interro-
gations, to whatever extent they occur in practice, can not be objec-
tively weighed. Certainly there are instances in which juveniles
might benefit from the formal station house adjustments made possi-
ble by their confessions under such circumstances. But to the extent
that juvenile confessions result in adjudication and punitive disposi-
tion or the negative consequences of a lengthy police record, such
tactics could damage juveniles' perceptions of the fairness of the sys-
tem. Further, it is arguable that friendly tactics are a form of deceit
177. Courts can easily identify those instances when police physically abused or overtly
threatened the juvenile suspect into confessing and can exclude such a confession from the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Subtle forms of coercion, however, are more likely to go unde-
tected. The suggested method for eliciting a confession from a juvenile is for the interrogator
to show sympathy, friendliness, and respect to the suspect. Driver, Confessions and the Social
Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 50-51 (1968); see also Interrogation of Juveniles,
supra note 141, at 323 (most coercion in interrogations does not involve physical threat).
178. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301 (1982).
179. F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 59-64 (1967); J.
KENNEY & J. REID. POLICE WORK WITH JUVENILES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE 211 (1970).
180. F. INBAU, supra note 179, at 20, 22-23; A. AUBRY, JR. & R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 41-42, 46, 50 (1965).
181. J. KENNEY, supra note 179, at 210.
182. A. AUBRY, supra note 180, at 180.
183. J. KENNEY, supra note 179, at 211.
184. Id. at 212.
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and coercion that takes advantage of the fear and general vulnerabil-
ity of many juveniles. Thus, whether or not juvenile confessions are
likely to be reliable under these conditions is a question of grave
concern.185 This is not to say, however, that a juvenile is better off
remaining silent.186
B. Characteristics and Behavior of Juveniles Most Susceptible to
Interrogation Tactics
Certain developmental, social status, and personality traits that
make an individual more likely to comply with the orders of persons
in positions of authority have been identified.18 7 In his study of con-
fessions and the social psychology of coercion, Edwin Driver has con-
cluded that persons who have little previous experience with the po-
lice and criminal justice system, are passive in nature, and have a
low social status vis-a-vis his confronter are more likely to "talk"
when questioned by police.'88 While persons of any age may possess
some of these traits, each of these traits is rather typical of
juveniles,189 and this enhances their susceptibility to coercion.
Moreover, one study shows that policemen make major deci-
sions regarding the disposition of juveniles on the basis of the juve-
nile's demeanor and attitude. 90 Most juveniles recognize this fact
and, therefore, typically respond to police in a respectful and cooper-
ative manner.' 9' This renders refusal to waive their Miranda rights
incompatible with such a cooperative attitude. The typical assump-
tion of children who have prior experience with the police is that
cooperation will reap good benefits. Nondelinquents, 92 however, hold
this same view. In one study, 93% of nondelinquents said it was
"better" for them to talk when confronted by the police.' The de-
tained juvenile, seeking to gain his release as soon as possible, is
under even greater compulsion to make a waiver and talk."9 " As one
commentator noted:
185. See, e.g., supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
187. Driver, supra note 177, at 56.
188. Id.
189. Interrogation of Juveniles, supra note 141, at 323.
190. Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. Soc. 206-214 (1964);
see also DAvis, supra note 179, at 3-13 & n.38.
191. Piliavin & Briar, supra note 190, at 206.
192. The term "nondelinquent" is used here to describe children who have not been or
are currently in violation of the law.
193. Ferguson, supra note 138, at 52.
194. Shoben, The Interrogated Juvenile: Caveat Confessor?, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 423
(1972-73).
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[S]ince nonwaiver is contrary to the short term goal of get-
ting released, there is an internal pressure not to exercise that
power. A child desperately may want the interrogation to cease,
but he also may want to appear cooperative because he feels, not
without cause, that it will be better to talk. This internal pres-
sure which the juvenile suspect feels, combined with the degree
of external pressure which can be so subtly generated by the
police, makes nonwaiver an unlikely phenomenon."9 5
This shortsightedness on the part of the detained juvenile makes the
basic confrontation with police authority suspect as to voluntariness.
In fact, social psychologist Stanley Milgram has demonstrated
that frequently individuals will irrationally obey persons of author-
ity.' 96 Milgram had subjects come to a laboratory at Yale Univer-
sity, ostensibly to participate in a study of the effects of punishment,
in the form of electric shocks, on learning. 9 ' A confederate of Mil-
gram's served as "learner," although his "teacher" subjects were
deceived into believing that roles were assigned by chance and that
the "learners" were also participants in the experiment. 98 Milgram's
study indicated that a majority of people could be induced by an
authority figure to deliver potentially dangerous shocks to another
human being, despite protests of pain. 9 9 The subjects were unable to
invent a response which would free them from the experimenter's
authority. 00 Milgram concluded that society does not provide ade-
quate models for refusing to comply with the wishes of an authority
figure, even when compliance is against one's own best judgment.2 '
This inability may hinder a juvenile suspect in the exercise of his
right to terminate an interrogation to consult an attorney.
C. Control of the Setting and Subtle Coercion
Specific factors present in the encounter between a police officer
and a suspect are known to induce suspects to confess during ques-
tioning. The confidentiality of the relationship, the intimate distance
between the interrogator and suspect, the suspect's isolation from
persons who could provide support and encouragement, and the am-
biguity and unpredictability of the setting all tend to increase the
195. Id.
196. Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HuM.
REL. 57 (1965).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 58.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 67.
201. Id.
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likelihood that suspects will confess. 202 Adults may be able to with-
stand this subtle coercion for a sufficient period of time so that coun-
sel may then be present, but empirical research demonstrates that
this is not the case with juveniles.2"'
D. The Significance of Remaining Silent
Silence is itself a form of communication. In the arrest situa-
tion, choosing to remain silent prevents correction of the impressions
that are communicated in conjunction with the questions asked by
the interrogator, leaving the silent suspect with the uneasy feeling
that he is being misinterpreted. 04 In effect, remaining silent may
operate as a confirmation of one's guilt, 0 5 and may be seen by the
juvenile as merely delaying the inevitable.20 6 This provides incentive
for the interrogator to ask questions or make comments that will call
for correction or clarification. Relief, therefore, is afforded the child
by talking to the police officer.
E. Miranda Warnings Attack the Juvenile's Adequacy
The final question of the standard Miranda warning is, "Do you
understand these rights?"207 To a juvenile, this may be seen as an
attack on his adequacy. "Of course I understand!" may be the natu-
ral response. The only alternative, in order to uphold his self-esteem,
is to answer in the affirmative. The juvenile will often have no reali-
zation of what he has done, other than the definite feeling that the
very test that was designed to dispel compulsion may actually create
it.
A self-report study of juveniles institutionalized for delinquency
revealed that forty percent of the delinquents interviewed claimed
they had been under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time
202. Driver, supra note 177, at 56. The variables that are identified as allowing the
suspect to resist confession during noncoercive interrogations are the definition of the encoun-
ter by the defendant as illegitimate or coercive and the immediate dislike of the interrogator
by the suspect. Id.
203. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
204. Driver, supra note 177, at 57.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 6. The U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), required that suspects be informed of their constitutional rights prior to custodial in-
terrogation. The wording of the warnings may vary slightly in different jurisdictions. M. To-
BIAS & R. PETERSON. A FIELD MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND POLICE PROCEDURE 123
(1975). Typically, the police officer will ask the suspect if he understands his rights and possi-
bly obtain a statement to that effect. Id. at 130.
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they were interrogated by the police. 20 8 At least one experiment indi-
cates that some drugs tend to make some individuals confess to real
or imagined crimes.2 09 The implications of this fact on the existence
of a knowing and intelligent waiver are obvious and alarming.
VI. Deficiencies of a Per Se Approach - The "Interested Adult"
Rule
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had good intentions
when it adopted a rule requiring that a parent or interested adult be
present to advise a child before he waives his Miranda rights, 210 such
an approach suffers from problems in its own right. The court be-
lieved that a parent's presence would reduce the likelihood of abusive
coercion and the pressures that are inherent in the status and power
differences between the juvenile suspect and the interrogator.211 Ad-
ditionally, it was thought that an interested adult could provide ad-
vice regarding the consequences of waiver that, because of the juve-
nile's immaturity or the emotional nature of the interrogation
circumstances, the juvenile might not be able to assess.21
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed that the presence of
an interested adult would benefit the child because of an identity of
interests and because parents can adequately understand their child's
legal rights and function as effective advisors. Such assumptions,
however, are not valid. Requiring parental presence during interro-
gation may increase rather than decrease the coercive pressures to
which the juvenile is subjected.21 3 The parents' potential conflict of
interest with the child, their emotional reactions to their child's ar-
rest, or their own intellectual or social disabilities may make them
208. Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 141, at 52. It should be noted that this statistic is
based upon a self-report study and is not otherwise proven. On the other hand, the problem of
the possible unreliability of confessions given while the suspect is under the influence of drugs
may be far more serious than this unsystematic sample indicates.
209. Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-induced Revelation and Criminal
Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315, 318-19 (1953). The drugs used in this experiment, however,
were sodium pentothal and sodium amytal, commonly known as "truth serums." As such, the
phenomenon may not be applicable to other drugs.
210. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
211. Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 188, 335 A.2d 698, 701 (1975).
212. Id.
213. One critic of the parental presence requirement noted:
[Will] the presence of this "friendly adult" ... create the intended results
[?] Parents, possibly ashamed and/or angered that their child is in custody, may
further coerce the child into owning up to the alleged offense, instead of afford-
ing youth shelter. Moreover, a parent may be no more knowledgeable than the
juvenile about constitutional rights and the consequences of a confession.
Comment, supra note 86, at 196.
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unable to play the envisioned supportive role for the child.214
Thomas Grisso's studies of parental behavior during interroga-
tion of their child and of parental attitudes toward interrogation in
fact reveal that parents are unlikely to be effective advocates for
their children during interrogation. In a study that was actually
designed and carried out by the Juvenile Court staff, actual parent-
child communication was observed in 390 interrogations. 15 In 71.3%
of the interrogations, parents told their child nothing about the right
to silence;216 in 81.3%, nothing was communicated about obtaining
an attorney.21 In fact, in 66.2% of the cases, parents offered no ad-
vice at all to the juvenile; 18 parental requests for information from
the court officer were even less common. 1 9 In those cases in which
parents did offer advice to the juvenile, the advice most commonly
given was to waive rights to silence and to legal counsel.22
In a study of middle-class parents attending PTA meetings in a
junior and senior high school, Grisso found that about one-third indi-
cated in response to a hypothetical situation that they would advise
their children to confess any involvement in a crime. 2 ' About half of
the remaining parents thought that juveniles should invoke the right
to silence temporarily until things "cool down" so that the juvenile
could tell his story with a clear head and in a relatively calm atmo-
sphere.22 Generally, it appears that parents commonly believe that
their children should waive their constitutional rights and make
confessions.
This phenomenon may be a result of the fact that adults them-
214. See Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 88, at 1142; Com-
ment, supra note 86, at 205; cf. Comment, The Judicial Response to Juvenile Confessions: An
Examination of the Per Se Rule, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 659, 681 (1978-79) (The specific guidelines
introduced through the per se rule have not supplanted the traditional totality of circumstances
test nor ended police and judicial speculation.).
215. Juveniles' Waiver of Rights, supra note 86, at 182. Of the 390 cases, 53% occurred
at the detention center, 40% at police stations, and 7% at other locations. Id. at 184.
216. Id. at 185.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. Parents asked court officer for general information in only 18.5% of the ob-
served cases.
220. Id. Regarding the right to silence, in 16.7% of the cases parents told their children
to waive this right. In 11.3% of the cases parents told their children to waive their right to an
attorney.
221. Grisso and Ring, Parents' Attitudes Toward Juveniles' Rights in Interrogation, 6
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 211, 218 (1979). The subjects were 753 parents, most of whom were
white. Sixty percent were female and most of the employed parents were in skilled positions.
Almost all subjects reported yearly income in excess of $12,000. Id. at 214. These demo-
graphic characteristics suggest that the results and interpretations may be generalizable only
to white, middle class parents.
222. Id. at 220.
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selves quite frequently do not understand or intelligently waive their
own Miranda rights.223 They seldom have legal training and may not
understand the problems facing the child.2 4 Rather than reducing
the pressures of interrogation and providing suitable advice, parents
appear predisposed to coercing their children to waive the right to
silence.
225
In light of these facts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's aban-
donment of the interested adult rule was wise, as such a rule does
not adequately safeguard a child's rights and may even aggravate
the problem. The interested adult rule introduced an additional tier
of litigable issues requiring courts to determine whether the parent
was informed of the juvenile's rights, whether the parent understood
those rights, and whether the parent had an adequate opportunity to
confer 26 This can only result in diverting judicial attention from an
assessment of the validity of the confession itself to a mechanical
inquiry into the parents' presence and understanding. However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision to reinstate the totality of
the circumstances test with the added consideration of whether an
interested adult was present at the juvenile's interrogation is hardly
an adequate alternative.227
VII. Recommendation: A Per Se Requirement of the Presence of
Counsel
Instead of relying on a discretionary review of the application of
223. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. Professor Grisso reached the fol-
lowing conclusions:
The most serious objections to this [parental presence] alternative concern
the ability of laymen to provide effective assistance in a preinterrogation setting.
Commentators have observed that many parents do not care, and that "[o]ften
the parents are, at best, only equal in capacity to the child and therefore poorly
equipped to comprehend the complexities confronting them." . . . When [the]
finding [of parents' attitudes toward juveniles' rights in interrogation] are cou-
pled with those of the instant studies, which indicated that many adults do not
themselves adequately understand their Miranda rights, the "interested adult"
alternative becomes even less attractive.
Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1163 (quoting McMillian &
McMurty, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile Court - Advocate or Social
Worker? 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 561, 570 (1970)). See also Driver, supra note 180, at 59 ("even
highly educated men may make incriminating admissions simply because they fail to compre-
hend the legal significance of their remarks"); Griffith & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda
Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L. 300, 305-10 (1967) (even sophisti-
cated subjects failed to understand the nature and function of their constitutional rights).
224. See supra notes 213-223 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 216, 221 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975) (mother
was an uninformed adult and therefore new trial awarded).
227. See supra notes 82-111, 210-26, 214-31 and accompanying text.
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the totality of the circumstances test in individual cases, a better
way to insure that the constitutional rights of a juvenile are pro-
tected is to adopt a per se rule that requires consultation with coun-
sel and the presence of an attorney at every interrogation of a juve-
nile prior to any waiver of the right to counsel.
As a result of his extensive research, Professor Grisso concluded
that the most effective means available for providing juveniles with
the special protections in interrogation would be to exclude confes-
sions obtained in interrogations conducted without the presence of
counsel.22 8 As Grisso aptly notes, parents and other "interested
adults" are unlikely to be effective advocates,229 and screening tech-
niques designed to identify the few juveniles competent to waive
their rights would be cumbersome and unreliable.80 Moreover, there
is no evidence to suggest that simplifying the Miranda warning for
juveniles would substantially improve their comprehension of fifth
amendment rights.231
Since waivers of both Miranda rights and the right to counsel
involve legal and strategic considerations as well as knowledge and
understanding of rights and an appreciation of consequences, it is
difficult to see how any other alternative could be as effective. 23 2 A
per se requirement of consultation with counsel prior to a waiver
takes into account the immaturity of youths and their lack of experi-
ence in law enforcement situations. In addition, it recognizes that
attorneys, rather than parents, possess the skills and training neces-
sary to assist the juvenile in the interrogation. 23
228. Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1166; Parents
Attitudes Toward Juveniles' Interrogation, supra note 221, at 224; Interrogation of Juveniles,
supra note 141, at 341.
229. Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1163.
230. Id. at 1162.
231. Juveniles' Waiver of Rights, supra note 86, at 197.
232. The right to counsel in the case of a juvenile is deemed so important that in some
instances an attorney's presence is required before a child can effectively waive his rights. In
Ezell v. State, 489 P.2d 781 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), the court held statements by a minor
inadmissible even though his parent and legal guardian were present when the minor was
advised of his constitutional rights. The basis of the court's decision was that the parent and
guardian were not knowledgeable about the law and were not in a position to counsel the
minor or make an effective waiver themselves; therefore, only the presence of an attorney
would have effectuated the minor's right to counsel and enabled him to make a knowing,
understanding waiver of his right to remain silent. Id. at 783-84.
233. See supra notes 213-23 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court,
in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), held that a defendant in a state criminal trial
has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he or she voluntarily and intelli-
gently elects to do so. Id. at 835-36. The Faretta Court emphasized that the sixth amendment
guarantees defendants the "assistance of counsel."
[The sixth amendment] speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an assis-
tant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth
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While no court has required the presence of a lawyer as a mat-
ter of course in all juvenile interrogations, the idea has received in-
creased attention. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration, 34 the Council of Judges of the National Coun-
cil on Crime and Delinquency,28 the National Advisory Committee
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 3 the Institute of Judicial
Administration and American Bar Association - Juvenile Justice
Standards Projects,8 7 and the United States Supreme Court in
Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by
the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant - not an organ of the
State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself
personally.
Id. at 820. The crucial issue for juveniles, as for adults, is whether such a waiver can occur
"voluntarily and intelligently," particularly without prior consultation with counsel. It would
be an extraordinary juvenile who is able to persuade a court that he or she possesses sufficient
maturity and legal sophistication to effect pro se representation and still obtain a fair trial.
234. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1967). The Commission has
recommended that counsel be appointed as a matter of course - without requiring affirmative
action on a child's part - whenever coercive action against a child is a possibility. Id.
235. See COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, Rule 25, Evidence at 53 (1969). The Council
of Judges has proposed that no extra-judicial statement by a child to a police officer, without
the presence of a parent or counsel, be admitted at trial. Id.
236. THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
(1976). Standard 5.8 provides: "When police are conducting a custodial investigation of an
individual who is legally a juvenile, they should take care not to allow that juvenile to waive
the right against self-incrimination without the advice of counsel." Id.
237. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT (1977) (hereinafter Juvenile Justice Standards]. The
Juvenile Justice Standards Project recommends that "[tihe right to counsel should attach as
soon as the juvenile is taken into custody . . . .when a petition is filed . . . .or when the
juvenile appears personally at an intake conference, whichever occurs first." Id. , Standards
Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings, Standard 5.1 at 89. In addition, "[the juvenile] should
have 'the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceeding'" and this right to
counsel is mandatory and nonwaivable. Id.
The commentary to the Standards does qualify the absolute, nonwaivable nature of the
right to counsel. "In recommending that the respondent's right to counsel in delinquency pro-
ceedings should be nonwaivable, this standard is not intended to foreclose absolutely the possi-
bility of pro se representation by a juvenile." Id. at 93.
The Standards Relating to Police Handling of Juvenile Problems, Standard 3.2 recom-
mends that:
Police investigation into criminal matters should be similar whether the sus-
pect is an adult or a juvenile. Juveniles, therefore, should receive at least the
same safeguards available to adults in the criminal justice system . . . . For
some investigative procedures, greater constitutional safeguards are needed be-
cause of the vulnerability of juveniles. Juveniles should not be permitted to waive
constitutional rights on their own.
Id. at 54.
The commentary to this section provides that Miranda warnings must be given to both
the juvenile and his parent or guardian and that following arrest a juvenile may be questioned
only after conferring with counsel. Questioning must take place in counsel's presence unless
the right to counsel has been waived, and waiver is possible only after consultation with and in
the presence of counsel. Id. at 70-71.
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Gault38 and Fare" 9 all emphasize the importance of adequate legal
counsel in situations where a juvenile's waiver of rights is likely to
affect the result of the proceeding. Mandatory, nonwaivable repre-
sentation by counsel not only protects the rights of the juvenile, but
also helps the courts by assisting in the efficient handling of cases
and assuring that any waivers that the juvenile is entitled to make
are in fact made knowingly and intelligently. ' °
238. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court in Gault mandated the right to
counsel because "a proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delin-
quent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution." Id. at 36. Because the decision to waive the privilege against self-incrimination
and confession often is determinative of the outcome of the proceeding, "the juvenile needs the
assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, [and]
to insist upon regularity of the proceedings . . . . The child requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." Id. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (emphasis added).
The Gault Court observed that the President's Crime Commission emphasized that the
right to counsel was the cornerstone of the entire procedural apparatus of juvenile justice, "the
keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum system of procedural justices
requires." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, supra note 234, at 38 n.65.
239. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). In Fare, the Supreme Court's holding
that a request for a probation officer was not a per se invocation of the right to counsel was
based on the crucial role of counsel in the criminal and juveniles processes. "It is this pivotal
role of legal counsel that justifies the per se rule established in Miranda, and that distinguishes
the request for counsel from the request for a probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend."
Id. at 722. The Fare Court elaborated the crucial role of counsel noting that:
the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique
ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial
interrogation. Because of this special ability of the lawyer to help the client pre-
serve his Fifth Amendment rights once the client becomes enmeshed in the ad-
versary process, the Court found that "the right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
under the system" established by the Court. Moreover, the lawyer's presence
helps guard against overreaching by the police and ensures that any statements
actually obtained are accurately transcribed for presentation into evidence.
The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based on the unique role the lawyer
plays in the adversary system of criminal justice in this country. Whether it is a
minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom
society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in his
dealings with the police and the courts.
Id. at 719 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)).
240. Juvenile Justice Standards, supra note 237, Standards Relating to Pretrial Court
Proceedings. Standard 5. I commentary at 92. Commentators have suggested other advantages
that could follow from mandatory representation of juveniles. Professor Grisso, for example,
has observed:
[W]hile defense counsel would almost always advise a client to remain si-
lent until the attorney has had the opportunity to review the case fully, the per
se proposal would not always reduce the amount of information the police ac-
quire about juvenile offenses. In some instances, the lawyer might assist the sus-
pect to explain clearly his noninvolvement in the incident; in other cases, the
lawyer might help the juvenile make a statement that is not susceptible to an
inaccurate or adverse interpretation by the police. At all events, since informa-
tion gathered from police interrogations of juveniles is often inaccurate and
therefore useless, the proposed per se rule could only serve to increase the accu-
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A rule requiring the assistance of counsel for juveniles prior to
waiver is not without its own difficulties.241 Every individual, how-
ever, is already entitled by Gaul124 ' and Miranda24 3 to the assistance
of counsel during interrogation and at every critical stage of the pro-
cess, and only an "inexperienced person in the toils of the law" will
cooperate with the police to the person's own detriment. 4 Only an
attorney can redress the imbalance between a vulnerable child and
the state.
VIII. Conclusion
The United States Constitution does not require mandatory,
nonwaivable counsel for juveniles, prohibit juveniles from waiving
their constitutional rights without prior consultation with an attor-
ney, or prevent juveniles from confronting the coercive power of the
state without the assistance of counsel. These requirements and
prohibitions are nonetheless options available to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court245 and the state legislature.24" The court's rejection
of the McCutchen "interested adult" rule in favor of the Williams
"totality of the circumstances" test is constitutional as well as
racy of any information imparted.
Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 86, at 1163-64.
241. A rule requiring nonwaivable assistance of counsel for juvenile suspects would
probably restrict the ability of police to obtain waivers from and interrogate youths who are
criminally sophisticated as well as those too immature to protect themselves. Indeed, courts
have decried the effects that procedural safeguards and per se rules would have on the efficient
repression of crime. "it is apparent most courts, required to deal pragmatically with an ever-
mounting crime waive in which minors play a disproportionate role, have considered society's
self-preservation interest in rejecting a blanket exclusion for juveniles' confessions." In re
Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Iowa 1976); see also Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218,
465 A.2d 989 (1983).
242. See supra note II.
243. See supra note 6.
244. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 203 (1968).
245. A judicial decision requiring the presence of counsel before waiver, if based on
state law, is an independent state ground not reviewable by the Supreme Court since it grants
a juvenile greater rights than those granted under the federal constitution. Only those decisions
that are based on federal law are of questionable validity following determination of the fed-
eral constitutional issue in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Henderson, 496 Pa. 349, 353, 437 A.2d 387, 389
(1981), upholding the interested adult rule, for example, was clearly based on state law and
was not affected by the Fare decision.
246. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West Supp. 1984-85) (prohibits the waiver
of counsel at interrogation by any youth under sixteen years of age without written parental
concurrence, and regardless of any Miranda waivers, no child of any age may waive the assis-
tance of counsel at any of the various stages and hearings of the juvenile justice process); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (with a few exceptions, if attorney is not
present and does not participate in the waiver of the right to remain silent, any incriminating
statements are inadmissible).
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clearly consistent with the law of a majority of other jurisdictions27
However, by turning away from the trend of decisions that
stressed the need for special protection of juveniles during custodial
interrogation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has blurred the dis-
tinction between juveniles and adults in this situation. The decision
to put juvenile offenders on the same procedural footing as adult
criminal defendants ignores the juveniles' relative immaturity, inex-
perience, and vulnerability to adult coercion. Requiring the presence
of an interested adult at the interrogation stage to help overcome the
disadvantages of youth was a step in the right direction. Yet, as the
substantial body of psychological and legal research suggests, the
only sure way to protect a juvenile's due process rights is to require
the presence of counsel prior to interrogation and at every other step
of the adversarial proceeding. The Pennsylvania courts take such a
protective stance towards minors in the civil law, and constitutional
rights under the criminal law are certainly no less important, partic-
ularly when a youth's future may lie in the balance.
Scott A. Burr
247. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); see also cases cited supra notes
95-96 (totality of the circumstances applied in majority of jurisdictions).

